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Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. 9 Plaintiffs suing under Koontz may have suffered a constitutional injury from a so-called "failed exaction," 10 but they cannot allege that their property was actually taken, and therefore cannot seek a remedy under the Just Compensation Clause. If a federal remedy is available in such cases, it derives solely from Section 1983, and Williamson County's reasoning and requirements are therefore inapplicable to these claims. This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide a general background of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and explain how it applies to exactions and threatened exactions. Part II will introduce the question left open by the Court in Koontz-what federal remedy applies when a permit application is denied because of refusal to accept an unconstitutional condition? Part III will argue that mere invalidation of the condition is an insufficient remedy and that Section 1983 entitles these plaintiffs to receive damages. Part IV will argue that Section 1983 "failed exaction" claims should be exempt from the ripeness requirements of Williamson County. A short conclusion will sum up the arguments.
I. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE

A. Formation
It was not always the case that the government lacked power to impose conditions on the exercise of constitutional rights. In fact, there is major tension between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the oft-repeated argument that a greater power necessarily includes a lesser one.
11 Justice Bradley is believed to be the first to use the term 9 See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) . 10 See Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 631-34 (2012). 11 The "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument-namely, the idea that if government has the power to entirely prohibit an activity, it necessarily may place any restriction on that activity-has strong intuitive appeal. Indeed, one commentator, explaining the tension between it and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, noted that "each statement-'no unconstitutional conditions' and 'the greater includes the lesser'-seems so self-evidently correct that it appears to follow, with mathematical certainty, that one's conclusion is correct." Brooks R. Funderberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 376-78 (1995) . Even as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has become widely accepted, the Supreme Court has not rejected the general premise that greater powers include lesser ones. 13 There, the majority upheld a Wisconsin statute that required the Secretary of State to revoke the business license of any out-of-state insurance company that exercised its right to remove a case from a Wisconsin state court to a federal court.
14 The Court reasoned that because the plaintiff had no constitutional right to do business in Wisconsin, the State must necessarily have the power to place conditions on a business license. 15 In response, Justice Bradley delivered a powerful rebuke of the "greater power includes the lesser" rule:
The argument used, that the greater always includes the less, and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees without any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is not sound. It is just as unsound as it would be for me to say, that, because I may without cause refuse to receive a man as my tenant, therefore I may make it a condition of his tenancy that he shall take the life of my enemy, or rob my neighbor of his property. 16 His concerns fell upon mostly deaf ears at first. In 1892, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected an individual's claim that his rights were violated when he was fired from a local police force in retaliation for political acts. 17 Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of Massachusetts, observed that " [t] here are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract." 18 Under this theory, Holmes posited that an employee "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
19 This is the classic statement of the "greater power includes the lesser" doctrine; 20 a particular policeman at all, it may demand that someone give up his constitutional rights in exchange for the job. The Court generally adhered to Justice Holmes' view during the first half of the twentieth century, 21 but it eventually embraced Justice Bradley's position. In a series of cases, the Court established that governments may not condition public employment on a person's agreement not to exercise his freedom to speak on matters of public concern.
22 Although most unconstitutional conditions cases arise under the First Amendment, 23 the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the doctrine to prevent the government from compromising rights under the Fourth Amendment 24 and the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 25 Thus, it is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has "long since rejected" Justice Holmes' theory. 26 In the process, it has, as a practical matter, rejected the notion that the greater government power always includes the lesser.
B. Application to Land-Use Exactions
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission granted the Nollans a permit to build a single-family home on their coastal property subject to a requirement that they dedicate a public-access easement. 27 The Nollans objected to the condition and a California trial court granted relief, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. 28 That court upheld the easement exaction on the ground that it was at least somewhat related to the need for coastal access. 29 It completed the constitutional analysis in a mere 21 In the Supreme Court, the Coastal Commission argued that its exaction was constitutional so long as it was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power and did not qualify as a taking under the Court's then-existing takings tests. 32 But the majority required more. First, the Court concluded that the Commission would have violated the Takings Clause had it simply demanded the easement outside of the permitting context. 33 However, the majority recognized that a state has the power to deny a development permit for any number of legitimate reasons. 34 Thus, the Court concluded that an exaction is unconstitutional unless it "serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit." 35 In the Nollans' case, the easement lacked any "nexus" to the Commission's stated purpose of protecting views of the beach. 36 Therefore, the Commission lacked the power to exact property that it would not be able to take in the abstract without providing compensation.
37
Although the Court did not explicitly invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it did address the Commission's argument that it that the development would create "a direct burden on public access." Id. On the contrary, it followed its construction of the California Supreme Court's decision in Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971), and required "only an indirect relationship between an exaction and a need to which the project contributes." Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723 (citing Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 165 (1985) 34 Id. at 835-36. 35 Id. at 836. 36 Id. at 838 ("It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house."). 37 Id. at 841-42. [Vol. 40:163 could demand the exaction as a condition so long as it had the power to deny the permit altogether. 38 The majority conceded that the "greaterincludes-the-lesser" argument has significant force when the condition on permit approval serves the same interest as would an outright denial.
39
When the relationship breaks down, however, so does the constitutional justification for the condition. As the Court explained, while a state could constitutionally ban shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, it could not then grant exemptions to those willing to pay a tax of $100, because the payment has no relationship to the harm caused by shouting "fire." 40 Thus, even though the opinion did not explicitly rely upon the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, its rejection of a broad "greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale reveals Nollan to be the first unconstitutional conditions case to vindicate property rights.
Seven years later, the Court was called upon to define the precise scope of Nollan. This time, it left no doubt that it had applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in Nollan and would do so again in Dolan. 41 There, a small-business owner applied to the City for a permit to raze her original store, build a new one about twice the size, and pave a larger parking lot. 42 The City Planning Commission told her that she could have the permit on two conditions: that she dedicate a portion of her property along a 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system, and give up an additional 15-foot strip of land for a bicycle pathway. 43 Unsatisfied with the conditions, Mrs. Dolan took her appeal through the Oregon state courts and all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
44
The Supreme Court agreed with the City that, under Nollan, there was a nexus between the demanded exactions and the government's 38 See id. at 836. 39 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. 40 Id. at 837. 41 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. However, the Court found that the City had not undertaken any individualized assessment to determine whether the exaction was roughly proportional to the impact of the proposed development. 46 As a result, the required dedications could not withstand judicial scrutiny. 47 Simply put, after Nollan and Dolan, government "may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts." 48 After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., where a unanimous Court described Nollan and Dolan as a "special application" of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 49 commentators agreed that the Court had created a new strand of unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence for land-use exactions, but they disagreed on the implications of that development.
50
Contrary to the expectations of many, however, transforming Nollan and Dolan into unconstitutional conditions cases has actually expanded their scope. 51 In Koontz, the Court considered for the first time whether Nollan 45 Id. at 387. 46 Id. at 388 ("The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development."); Id. at 391 ("We think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."). 47 Id. at 395-96. 48 and Dolan should apply where a property owner is denied a permit because he refused to accede to a demand that he pay for improvements elsewhere. 52 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, explained that government agencies are still subject to the constraints of Nollan and Dolan when they deny permits for failure to pay a monetary exaction. 53 The Court reasoned that "[a] contrary rule . . . would enable the government to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions precedent to permit approval." 54 The majority opinion was yet another example of the unconstitutional conditions rationale prevailing over the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument. Justice Alito specifically rejected the water district's argument that, because it has the power to outright deny any permit application, it may require the applicant to pay for unrelated mitigation as a condition of receiving the permit instead. 55 The Court held that "[e]ven if [the district] would have been entirely within its rights in denying the permit for some other reason, that greater authority does not imply a lesser power to condition permit approval on [the property owner's] forfeiture of his constitutional rights." 56 Koontz thus represents another expansion in the protection of individual rights under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as well as perhaps the final nail in the coffin for the "greater-includesthe-lesser" theory.
The majority's application of Nollan and Dolan in Koontz illustrates how framing the case as a freestanding unconstitutional conditions violation broadened the scope of the exactions cases. 57 All nine justices agreed that the water district had taken no property from Mr. Koontz. 58 Yet the majority concluded that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine filled the gap left by the lack of an actual taking. Justice Alito explained of Koontz, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 562 (2014) ("The Court's conclusion in Koontz unwisely expanded the intended scope of Nollan and Dolan."). 52 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592-94. 53 Id. at 2591, 2595-96, 2598-2600. 54 Id. at 2595. 55 Id. at 2596. 56 Id. 57 See Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 407-09 (2014) (arguing that the Koontz Court concluded "the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its broad anticoercion principle could at once resolve and even transcend any formalist concerns about takings doctrine and the Fifth Amendment's text"). 58 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 ("Where the permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, nothing has been taken."); id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the government denies a permit because an owner has refused to accede to that same demand, nothing has actually been taken."); Fenster, supra note 57, at 408.
that "[e]xtortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just compensation." 59 As such, if Mr. Koontz could show that the water district's demand exceeded the limits set by Nollan and Dolan, he would establish a "constitutionally cognizable injury." 60 Koontz both significantly expanded the reach of Nollan and Dolan, and transformed how commentators viewed those cases. 61 This Article argues that the change effected by Koontz opens the door to expanded damages remedies under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II. THE KOONTZ REMEDY QUESTION
While the Koontz decision was widely hailed as a great victory for property rights, 62 it left one important question unresolved. Namely, what is the proper remedy for a property owner whose permit application is denied because he refused to accede to the government's demands? The Court held only that Nollan and Dolan apply to permit denials and monetary exactions, but remanded the case to the Florida state courts to 59 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596. 60 Id. determine the proper remedy under that State's law. 63 As Justice Alito explained, the Court "need not decide whether federal law authorizes plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims predicated on the Takings Clause because petitioner brought his claim under state law." 64 Mr. Koontz's potential problem was that he brought his claim under a Florida statute authorizing recovery of damages for "an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power constituting a taking without just compensation." 65 But the Supreme Court could only decide whether the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in determining that Nollan and Dolan are inapplicable to permit denials and monetary exactions. 66 It had no power to determine the proper remedy under a state statute. 67 Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority on the remedy question. In her view, it was wrong to remand the case to the Florida courts because it was clear on the face of the statute that Mr. Koontz had no state-law remedy. 68 Although she recognized that the existence of a remedy under a state statute was a question "which we usually do well to leave to state courts," this time was different. 69 The statute so plainly applied only to actions constituting a taking that it could not possibly create a remedy for Mr. Koontz in a situation where all nine justices agreed no taking had occurred. 70 Thus, even assuming the majority was correct about the proper application of Nollan and Dolan, Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues would have affirmed the judgment in favor of the water district on that ground alone. 71 On remand, the Florida District Court of Appeal once again held that Mr. Koontz was entitled to damages under the statute. 72 Echoing Justice Kagan, Judge Griffin once again dissented. She argued that, because the Court unanimously agreed there had been no taking, "[i]f there is to be a summary disposition of this case, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision . . . , that disposition must be in favor of the [water district], not Koontz." 73 This was true because of the analytical difference between "exactions taking" cases like Nollan and Dolan and "failed exactions" like Koontz.
74 In the latter case, "the agency has committed a legal wrong that may be redressed in a variety of ways, including a damages remedy if authorized by state law." 75 That legal wrong is a freestanding unconstitutional conditions violation, which does not require an actual taking in order to be a "constitutionally cognizable injury."
76 But, in the view of the dissents (and quite possibly of the Florida Supreme Court), Mr. Koontz simply sued under the wrong statute for the wrong remedy.
77
Even if we assume that Justice Kagan and Judge Griffin are correct about the lack of a remedy under state law, that answer raises the question of whether property owners in Mr. Koontz's position may recover damages under federal law through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As noted above, Koontz explicitly left open the question of any federal remedy because it was unnecessary to the outcome. 78 Scott Woodward has argued in a recent article that the Nollan/Dolan/Koontz standard "is really more of a prophylactic standard than a remedial standard" and thus the proper remedy is simply the invalidation of the offending condition.
79 He assumes that the only possible remedies for an unconstitutional conditions violation in 73 Id. at *2 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 74 Id. at *3. 75 Id. 76 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (majority opinion). 77 See id. at 2597 (citing the water district's argument that Mr. Koontz "sued in the wrong court, for the wrong remedy, and at the wrong time."); id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[N]one of the Florida courts in this case suggested that the majority's hypothesized remedy actually exists; rather, the trial and appellate courts imposed a damages remedy on the mistaken theory that there had been a taking ( 78 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 ("where the permit is denied and the condition is never imposed, nothing has been taken."); id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[w]hen the government denies a permit because an owner has refused to accede to that same demand, nothing has actually been taken."). 79 93 the plaintiff sought a permit to build a convenience store adjacent to his already-operational gas station. 94 The City refused to grant the permit unless the plaintiff gave up an expanded right-of-way along the property to expand a street, which the plaintiff would not do.
95
District Judge Morris S. Arnold, now on the Eighth Circuit, concluded that the City had not met its burden under Nollan to show that the "plaintiff's planned expansion of its business will create additional burdens on the present public right-of-way along" the street.
96 But the furthestreaching portion of the opinion was the last sentence, which described the remedy for the Nollan violation: "an injunction will issue ordering the City to issue the requested permit unconditionally." 97 Judge Arnold's remedy was extraordinary. Going back to the formation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it has always been recognized as a partial repudiation of the "greater-includes-the-lesser" 92 The Florida Legislature recently amended the law to clarify that a state law remedy exists for failed exactions. The relevant statute provides that, "[i]n addition to other remedies available in law or equity, a property owner may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction under this section to recover damages caused by a prohibited exaction." Fla. Stat. § 70.45(2). Before bringing a claim, the affected property owner must file a notice explaining to the relevant agency why he believes the exaction is prohibited. Id. § 70.45(3). The government then must respond in writing with an explanation of why the particular exaction satisfies Nollan and Dolan. Id. § 70.45(3)(a). Should the dispute proceed to litigation, the statute places the burden on the government to prove that the exaction satisfies the nexus and rough proportionality requirements. Id. 70.45(4). Given the dispute over remedy that still exists in the ongoing Koontz litigation, it was sensible for the legislature to make this clarification. It should not be read as an admission that no such remedy existed before the statute was passed. 93 
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WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 179 rationale. 98 As such, courts finding a condition unconstitutional cannot issue a mandatory injunction unless the permitting authority lacks the discretion to deny the permit after the condition is struck. 99 To do so would be to deny the existence of the greater power because of the agency's abuse of a lesser power. 100 The Court observed as much in Koontz, noting that "[e]ven if [the water district] would have been entirely within its rights in denying the permit for some other reason, that greater authority does not imply a lesser power to condition permit approval on [Mr. Koontz's] forfeiture of his constitutional rights." 101 In a failed exaction situation, the government's power to deny the permit outright is generally not at issue. 102 Thus, it is usually not an appropriate remedy to order the issuance of an unconditional permit when the government may, through its legitimate power, deny the permit.
103
It is important to note that a permitting agency's power to deny a permit application for legitimate reasons does not mean that the denial will be without consequences. On the contrary, outright denial could give rise to takings liability if it leaves the property with no viable economic use. 104 In such cases, the government agency's proffered rationale is 98 irrelevant; the action is a "categorical" taking. 105 Even if courts lack the power to issue a mandatory injunction, permitting agencies will have to tread somewhat carefully to avoid takings liability, even if they do possess a substantial interest in denying the permit.
B. Mere Invalidation Is Not Enough
As noted above, some have suggested that the only federal remedy for a failed attempt to impose an unconstitutional condition should be invalidation of that condition. 106 Under this theory, once a condition is invalidated by a court, the permitting decision is remanded to the government agency, which has an opportunity to reconsider its decision and impose another condition.
107 Such a regime is beneficial to local planning boards-they will suffer little recourse for imposing conditions that turn out to be unconstitutional. 108 Woodward argues that this is a desirable result because a monetary remedy would "force the permitting authority to go forward with a decision that it might not want to make after being put on notice that the condition it has imposed is not permissible."
109 But this overlooks the fact that the imposition of the condition, in and of itself, is a significant constitutional injury. 110 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine should provide more protection against the violation of a constitutional right than would simple invalidation and remand. 105 See id. at 1015. The Court emphasized that a government entity could violate the Takings Clause in two ways: "when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.' " Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added). Thus, a taking in the Lucas framework does not depend on a judicial evaluation of government interests, investment-backed expectations, or any other factors. If a permit denial deprives a property of all viable economic use, it will be declared a taking. Id. 106 See generally Woodward, supra note 79. 107 See id. at 740 ("Invalidation only zeroes out the offending condition, which can then be narrowed or otherwise tailored to be constitutional."). 108 See id. at 740 n.248 ("While equitable in nature, [invalidation] is not a severe remedy and is in fact more lenient towards a permitting authority than would be a compensation remedy."). 109 Id. at 740. 110 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 ("[R]egardless of whether the government ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution's enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who exercise them."); id. at 2596 ("As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.").
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WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 181 Justice Brennan made the case against invalidation as the sole remedy in his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego. 111 Having found a regulatory taking, 112 he addressed "whether a government entity may constitutionally deny payment of just compensation to the property owner and limit his remedy to mere invalidation of the regulation instead." 113 He correctly concluded that "[i]nvalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly compensate the landowner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was taken."
114 More importantly, "[i]nvalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional regulations by the government entity."
115
On the contrary, it permits the government to continue imposing such regulations. 116 The worst that could happen to a permitting entity in that situation would be a court order telling it to go back and try again.
117
This reasoning applies equally in the failed exactions context. In a world where invalidation of the condition was the only remedy for the imposition of an unconstitutional condition, permitting agencies would be empowered to prevent development indefinitely. 118 In theory, the agency 192-93 (1975) ). 118 Consider the situation in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). There, the landowners first created a development plan in 1981 but had revised plans repeatedly rejected by the planning commission, preventing any development. [Vol. 40:163
need not ever grant any permit. 119 Rather, it could continue going through iterations of the administrative process for all eternity, imposing different conditions and having the courts strike each down as unconstitutional. In the meantime, the property owner is held in legal limbo, unable to make desired use of the property without a permit but also unable to claim complete victory in court even after winning on multiple conditions. 120 With the usual disparity in resources between individual property owners and government agencies, the latter will usually be able to win in property disputes simply by attrition.
121
Mere invalidation of an unconstitutional condition is equivalent to granting the government a "do-over" for violating the property owner's constitutional rights. Deterring constitutional violations is one of the important purposes of Section 1983 liability.
122 But an invalidation remedy would hardly deter anyone from committing the same or similar violations
See id. at 695-98. "After five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, [the property owners] decided the city would not permit development of the property under any circumstances." Id. at 698. A jury eventually determined in 1994 that the planning commission's actions had effected a taking, id. at 701, and the Supreme Court affirmed in 1999, id. at 723. Thus, it took 18 years to finally resolve the conflict between the property owners and the planning commission. 119 The ability to indefinitely hold up the permitting process by repeatedly amending conditions is distinct from a permitting agency's legitimate power to deny a permit application. When it denies a permit, an agency must provide some reason for its decision, lest it be held an arbitrary exercise of power. Moreover, the landowner may at least challenge the denial as lacking a reasonable basis or as a taking under Lucas or Penn Central. When the agency holds the permit application in flux, the property owner has no remedy and never receives a final decision. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-35. 120 See Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 111 n.167 (2012) (indicating that a problem with a pure invalidation remedy in regulatory takings is "that an actor could engage in a series of regulatory takings with impunity by simply dropping or amending a given regulation upon losing a challenge."). 121 See id. at 113-14. 122 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails."); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) ("Respondent is correct in asserting that the deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an important purpose of § 1983."); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 548 (1989) ("Commentators generally agree that the Forty-Second Congress enacted section 1983 for at least four purposes: (1) to deter the Ku Klux Klan or others of like mind from violating the constitutional rights of innocent citizens; (2) to provide a federal remedy for any violations of constitutional rights; (3) to provide compensation to the victims of lawless state action; and (4) to reaffirm the underlying principles of the fourteenth amendment.").
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WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 183 in the future. 123 This conclusion is not based on conjecture; the City Attorney quoted by Justice Brennan illustrates how local governments are willing to string out the permitting process so long as they suffer no consequences other than seeing the unconstitutional condition struck down.
124
Far from proper deterrence, invalidation and remand may actually encourage regulators to continue to impose unconstitutional conditions so long as it accomplishes their goal of limiting development.
125
On the other hand, if local land use boards were aware that they could be subject to damages for the threatened imposition of an unconstitutional condition, the deterrence value of an unconstitutional condition finding would skyrocket. Instead of proposing a condition first and then having a court decide whether it is constitutional under Nollan and Dolan, agencies would be encouraged to impose more legally defensible conditions on the use of private property. Just as a damages remedy in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case serves to encourage police not to overstep their bounds in confrontations with suspects, a damages remedy in the failed exactions context would encourage regulators to remain within the limits of the Constitution when imposing land-use exactions.
C. Damages Remedies Are Common in Other Unconstitutional Conditions Contexts
Woodward has suggested that "[i]n general, the remedy for an unconstitutional conditions violation is invalidation of the condition."
126
Under that view, the protection against unconstitutional conditions "operates to remove barriers to obtaining important public benefits, but it does not guarantee their acquisition."
127 While it is true that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not guarantee the receipt of government benefits, that recognition rules out only the mandatory injunction remedy. 128 It says nothing about whether a property owner-or any other unconstitutional conditions plaintiff-may recover compensatory damages as a result of the imposition of the condition. 
131
In Perry, a college professor sought damages and reinstatement after the college declined to renew his one-year employment contract when he engaged in a high-profile dispute with the Board of Regents. 132 The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that a factual dispute should have precluded judgment as a matter of law on the First Amendment claim. 133 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the professor's lack of tenure did not preclude his unconstitutional conditions claim. 134 However, the Court said nothing about the proper remedy; it merely agreed that the district court was wrong to dispose of the First Amendment claim on summary judgment.
135
In Mount Healthy, a teacher sued the board of education asserting that he was dismissed in retaliation for several controversial incidents, including a phone call he made to a local radio station. 136 The district court held that the teacher was entitled to reinstatement with back-pay, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 137 But the Supreme Court vacated the lower courts, holding that the district court should have determined "whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct."
138 As a result, the Court had no occasion to consider the proper remedy. Although property owners rarely prevail on challenges to land-use regulations under a substantive due process theory, 167 the few cases above illustrate that when they do, they are entitled to damages under federal law. To a property owner, there is little difference between an arbitrary denial of a permit application and denial because the owner refused to accede to an unconstitutional condition. 168 In both cases, the permitting agency has abused its powers by withholding a government benefit for an improper reason. 169 And in both cases, damages are the only remedy that suffices to compensate the property owner and deter future constitutional violations.
170
What is more, damages are much easier to ascertain in permit denial cases than for speech restrictions. Outside of the loss of employment 164 Id. at 1306 ("[A]ppellants' withholding of Bateson's building permit violated Bateson's substantive due process rights, took place pursuant to a municipal policy, and caused Bateson's damages."); see also Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 197 ("The remedy for a regulation that goes too far, under the due process theory, is not 'just compensation,' but invalidation of the regulation, and if authorized and appropriate, actual damages."). 165 See Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989). 166 Id. at 311-13. The district court had awarded nominal damages because the plaintiff's "evidence of damages was far too speculative." Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). 167 1467-68 (1996) . 168 The Eighth Circuit's Cunningham opinion demonstrates this similarity, particularly when it refers to the arbitrary imposition of an unconstitutional condition on the granting of a permit in the context of a substantive due process claim. See Cunningham, 804 F.2d at 1068. 169 The Nollan/Dolan doctrine identifies situations where the permitting agency has exceeded its authority by making an extortionate demand not sufficiently related in kind or scope to the effects of the proposed development. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595. 170 Property owners may prefer the issuance of a mandatory injunction in due process cases as well as failed exactions, but, as discussed above, such a remedy is not always possible. Suppose a property owner applied for a building permit and was denied for the simple reason that a majority of the members of the permitting agency did not like the color of the proposed house, even though the relevant code does not say that aesthetics can constitute a valid reason for denying a permit. Such a decision would be "arbitrary" or "irrational" under any definition of those words, and thus the permit denial would violate due process. But courts would have difficulty ordering the agency to issue the permit unless they were convinced that the agency could have no legitimate reason to deny it again. Thus, in many cases damages are the only way to adequately compensate a property owner after a permit denial.
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WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 189 and wages (both of which can be addressed through equitable remedies), it is difficult to calculate damages caused by imposing a condition on speech. 171 Often, there may be no appreciable damages that cannot be awarded through back-pay. 172 But in permit denial cases (whether they be failed exaction challenges under Koontz or substantive due process cases), there will nearly always be economic repercussions. The denial of a land-use permit could cause a property owner to be unable to start 173 or expand a business, 174 or simply require a landowner to give up real estate that has other productive uses.
175 Unlike in the speech context, equitable relief often provides little help to these property owners. Therefore, economic damages are the only way to satisfy Section 1983's primary purpose to compensate those who suffer a constitutional injury.
176 171 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 145, at 275. 172 See, e.g., id. at 282-83, 283 n.40. 173 See Goss, 151 F.3d at 862 (denial of application to rezone property from residential to commercial). 174 See Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1302 (denial of permit to builder who sought to build condominium development and convenience store on his newly acquired property). 175 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592-93. 176 It can also be argued that property rights cases are fundamentally different from typical First Amendment unconstitutional conditions cases. For one, failed exaction cases involve the defense of the fundamental right to private property. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 115 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Blackstone classifies these fundamental rights under three heads, as the absolute rights of individuals, to wit: the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. And of the last he says: 'The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 161, 206 (2000) ("Repeatedly, the Framers justified private property as a fundamental right by referring to fundamental tradition."). When a property owner sees his land-use permit application denied, he loses the right to use his property as he would like. As the Nollan Court recognized, "the right to build on one's own propertyeven though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.' " Nollan, 483 U.S. at 845 n.2.
On the contrary, public employment and federal funding are plainly governmental benefits. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976) (citing Perry, 408 U.S. 597). Therefore, even if it were true that courts had recognized invalidation as the sole remedy for unconstitutional conditions cases in the First Amendment context, it would not necessarily follow that the same should be true in property rights cases. Those claiming an entitlement to a government benefit are simply not on equal footing with those attempting to exercise a fundamental right. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that while public education is not a constitutional right, "neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation"); see also Lynn
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the exact calculation of damages in every failed exaction case. However, the Florida courts in Koontz applied a formula that would likely work in most cases. As dissenting Judge Griffin explained in Koontz IV, the trial court awarded damages equivalent to "the rental value of the property based on a valuation with the permit" less the value of the property without the permit. 183 Of course, the state court awarded damages under the theory that the permit denial effected a temporary taking of Mr. Koontz's property. 184 Nonetheless, the court's valuation illustrates that it is within the judicial competence to value property with and without a land-use permit. Courts should not shy away from awarding damages simply because there is no precise valuation method; if that were common practice, damages would be unavailable in many cases.
185
F. Conclusion
Whether property owners may successfully sue for damages when their permit is denied after a failed exaction will have a profound effect on land-use decisions. The availability of actual damages would presumably shape the actions of local governments more than has the Koontz at the cost of an exaction. Thus, the property owner's injury is the exaction itself, rather than the loss of the permit. The Court also distinguished the two, noting that "the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy-just compensation-only for takings." Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (emphasis omitted). After Koontz, it appears fairly clear that the available remedy in Nollan/Dolan cases is just compensation for the exacted property. 183 Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 17 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 184 See id. at 10 (majority opinion) ("After hearing conflicting evidence, the trial court concluded that the District had effected a taking of Mr. Koontz represents "a marked change from past practice" in its willingness to allow state law to essentially decide federal constitutional tort actions, and noting that "Williamson County's conflict with Section 1983's no-exhaustion principle is obvious and has been widely criticized."). That inconsistency is even more pronounced outside of the special confines of the Just Compensation Clause. 209 It is true that even before Williamson County, federal courts sometimes abstained from deciding takings claims. They often did so for similar reasons as courts now find claims unripe under the state litigation requirement. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the merits of federal courts using abstention doctrines to avoid failed exaction cases. The purpose of this Part is only to argue that federal courts should not use the Williamson County state litigation doctrine-which has "greatly relaxed the requirements for declining to exercise Article III jurisdiction"-as a vehicle to avoid these cases. 
2015]
WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 197 CONCLUSION The Court's decision in Koontz was a triumph for individual constitutional rights. For one, all nine justices recognized that a government entity violates the Constitution when it denies a land-use permit because the property owner refused to accept an unconstitutional condition. 210 Second, the Court accepted that demands to pay money, no less than exactions of real property, create "special vulnerability" for property owners going through the permitting process. 211 Both of these developments mean that landowners will be less susceptible to bullying by local governments and more able to protect their constitutional property rights. 212 But important questions remain, the resolution of which could determine whether Koontz fulfills its significant promise.
First, partly due to the procedural posture of the case, the Court declined to say what remedies might be available upon proof that a permit denial violated the Koontz principle. Of course, as the Koontz case shows, states may devise their own remedies to deal with unconstitutional conditions claims. But that ignores the fact that failed exactions plaintiffs have suffered an injury cognizable under the federal constitution. Where there is a federal right, there must be a federal remedy.
This Article posits no more than that the federal remedy should be consistent with the remedy in other cases brought under Section 1983: actual damages. Mere invalidation of the offending condition is simply not enough when the government holds the bargaining power and could easily replace the condition with another equally objectionable one the second time around. The dual purposes of Section 1983 are to compensate victims of constitutional torts and deter government agents from committing such violations in the future. 213 Standing alone, invalidation of the condition accomplishes neither of these goals. Without accompanying damages, the affected property owner receives nothing while permitting agency is free to impose further conditions. The result could be years of fighting over permit conditions without the ability to use the property.
In order to realize the promise of the Koontz decision and encourage regulators to make sure that exactions do not go beyond mitigating
